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fullstack-starter/docs/工具箱端-授权对接指南/工具箱端-报告加密与签名生成指南.md

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# 工具箱端 - 报告加密与签名生成指南
## 概述
本文档说明工具箱端如何生成加密和签名的检查报告 ZIP 文件,以确保:
1. **授权校验**:只有合法授权的工具箱才能生成有效的报告
2. **防篡改校验**:确保报告内容在传输过程中未被篡改
> ### UX 集成模式补充(当前项目实现)
>
> 在当前集成模式中,工具箱可将原始报告 ZIP 直接上传到 UX 的 `crypto.signAndPackReport`
>
> 1. UX 校验 ZIP 并提取必需文件;
> 2. UX 生成 `deviceSignature`、`summary.json`、`META-INF/manifest.json`、`META-INF/signature.asc`
> 3. UX 重新打包并返回签名后的 ZIP二进制文件响应工具箱再用于离线介质回传平台。
## 一、ZIP 文件结构要求
工具箱生成的 ZIP 文件必须包含以下文件:
```
report.zip
├── summary.json # 摘要信息(必须包含授权和签名字段)
├── assets.json # 资产信息(用于签名校验)
├── vulnerabilities.json # 漏洞信息(用于签名校验)
├── weakPasswords.json # 弱密码信息(用于签名校验)
├── 漏洞评估报告.html # 漏洞评估报告(用于签名校验)
└── META-INF/
├── manifest.json # 文件清单(用于 OpenPGP 签名)
└── signature.asc # OpenPGP 签名文件(防篡改)
```
## 二、授权校验 - 设备签名device_signature
### 2.1 目的
设备签名用于验证报告是由合法授权的工具箱生成的,防止第三方伪造扫描结果。
### 2.2 密钥派生
使用 **HKDF-SHA256** 从设备的 `licence``fingerprint` 派生签名密钥:
```
K = HKDF(
input = licence + fingerprint, # 输入密钥材料(字符串拼接)
salt = "AUTH_V3_SALT", # 固定盐值
info = "device_report_signature", # 固定信息参数
hash = SHA-256, # 哈希算法
length = 32 # 输出密钥长度32字节 = 256位
)
```
**伪代码示例**
```python
import hkdf
# 输入密钥材料
ikm = licence + fingerprint # 字符串直接拼接
# HKDF 参数
salt = "AUTH_V3_SALT"
info = "device_report_signature"
key_length = 32 # 32字节 = 256位
# 派生密钥
derived_key = hkdf.HKDF(
algorithm=hashlib.sha256,
length=key_length,
salt=salt.encode('utf-8'),
info=info.encode('utf-8'),
ikm=ikm.encode('utf-8')
).derive()
```
### 2.3 签名数据组装(严格顺序)
签名数据必须按照以下**严格顺序**组装:
```
sign_payload =
taskId + # 任务ID字符串
inspectionId + # 检查ID数字转字符串
SHA256(assets.json) + # assets.json 的 SHA256hex字符串小写
SHA256(vulnerabilities.json) + # vulnerabilities.json 的 SHA256hex字符串小写
SHA256(weakPasswords.json) + # weakPasswords.json 的 SHA256hex字符串小写
SHA256(漏洞评估报告.html) # 漏洞评估报告.html 的 SHA256hex字符串小写
```
**重要说明**
- 所有字符串直接拼接,**不添加任何分隔符**
- SHA256 哈希值必须是 **hex 字符串(小写)**,例如:`a1b2c3d4...`
- 文件内容必须是**原始字节**,不能进行任何编码转换
- 顺序必须严格一致,任何顺序错误都会导致签名验证失败
**伪代码示例**
```python
import hashlib
# 1. 读取文件内容(原始字节)
assets_content = read_file("assets.json")
vulnerabilities_content = read_file("vulnerabilities.json")
weak_passwords_content = read_file("weakPasswords.json")
report_html_content = read_file("漏洞评估报告.html")
# 2. 计算 SHA256hex字符串小写
def sha256_hex(content: bytes) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
assets_sha256 = sha256_hex(assets_content)
vulnerabilities_sha256 = sha256_hex(vulnerabilities_content)
weak_passwords_sha256 = sha256_hex(weak_passwords_content)
report_html_sha256 = sha256_hex(report_html_content)
# 3. 组装签名数据(严格顺序,直接拼接)
sign_payload = (
str(task_id) +
str(inspection_id) +
assets_sha256 +
vulnerabilities_sha256 +
weak_passwords_sha256 +
report_html_sha256
)
```
### 2.4 生成设备签名
使用 **HMAC-SHA256** 计算签名:
```
device_signature = Base64(HMAC-SHA256(key=K, data=sign_payload))
```
**伪代码示例**
```python
import hmac
import base64
# 使用派生密钥计算 HMAC-SHA256
mac = hmac.new(
key=derived_key, # 派生密钥32字节
msg=sign_payload.encode('utf-8'), # 签名数据UTF-8编码
digestmod=hashlib.sha256
)
# 计算签名
signature_bytes = mac.digest()
# Base64 编码
device_signature = base64.b64encode(signature_bytes).decode('utf-8')
```
### 2.5 写入 summary.json
`device_signature` 写入 `summary.json`
```json
{
"orgId": 1173040813421105152,
"checkId": 702286470691215417,
"taskId": "TASK-20260115-4875",
"licence": "LIC-8F2A-XXXX",
"fingerprint": "FP-2c91e9f3",
"deviceSignature": "Base64编码的签名值",
"summary": "检查摘要信息",
......
}
```
**必需字段**
- `licence`:设备授权码(字符串)
- `fingerprint`:设备硬件指纹(字符串)
- `taskId`任务ID字符串
- `deviceSignature`设备签名Base64字符串
- `checkId``inspectionId`检查ID数字
## 三、防篡改校验 - OpenPGP 签名
### 3.1 目的
OpenPGP 签名用于验证 ZIP 文件在传输过程中未被篡改,确保文件完整性。
### 3.2 生成 manifest.json
创建 `META-INF/manifest.json` 文件,包含所有文件的 SHA-256 哈希值:
```json
{
"files": {
"summary.json": "a1b2c3d4e5f6...",
"assets.json": "b2c3d4e5f6a1...",
"vulnerabilities.json": "c3d4e5f6a1b2...",
"weakPasswords.json": "d4e5f6a1b2c3...",
"漏洞评估报告.html": "e5f6a1b2c3d4..."
}
}
```
**伪代码示例**
```python
import hashlib
import json
def calculate_sha256_hex(content: bytes) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
# 计算所有文件的 SHA256
files_hashes = {
"summary.json": calculate_sha256_hex(summary_content),
"assets.json": calculate_sha256_hex(assets_content),
"vulnerabilities.json": calculate_sha256_hex(vulnerabilities_content),
"weakPasswords.json": calculate_sha256_hex(weak_passwords_content),
"漏洞评估报告.html": calculate_sha256_hex(report_html_content)
}
# 生成 manifest.json
manifest = {
"files": files_hashes
}
manifest_json = json.dumps(manifest, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
```
### 3.3 生成 OpenPGP 签名
使用工具箱的**私钥**对 `manifest.json` 进行 OpenPGP 签名,生成 `META-INF/signature.asc`
**伪代码示例(使用 Python gnupg**
```python
import gnupg
# 初始化 GPG
gpg = gnupg.GPG()
# 导入私钥(或使用已配置的密钥)
# gpg.import_keys(private_key_data)
# 对 manifest.json 进行签名
with open('META-INF/manifest.json', 'rb') as f:
signed_data = gpg.sign_file(
f,
detach=True, # 分离式签名
clearsign=False, # 不使用明文签名
output='META-INF/signature.asc'
)
```
**伪代码示例(使用 BouncyCastle - Java/Kotlin**
```kotlin
import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.*
import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.operator.jcajce.JcaPGPContentSignerBuilder
import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.operator.jcajce.JcaPGPPrivateKey
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
import java.io.FileOutputStream
fun generatePGPSignature(
manifestContent: ByteArray,
privateKey: PGPPrivateKey,
publicKey: PGPPublicKey
): ByteArray {
val signatureGenerator = PGPSignatureGenerator(
JcaPGPContentSignerBuilder(publicKey.algorithm, PGPUtil.SHA256)
)
signatureGenerator.init(PGPSignature.BINARY_DOCUMENT, privateKey)
signatureGenerator.update(manifestContent)
val signature = signatureGenerator.generate()
val signatureList = PGPSignatureList(signature)
val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
val pgpOut = PGPObjectFactory(PGPUtil.getEncoderStream(out))
signatureList.encode(out)
return out.toByteArray()
}
```
### 3.4 打包 ZIP 文件
将所有文件打包成 ZIP 文件,确保包含:
- 所有报告文件summary.json、assets.json 等)
- `META-INF/manifest.json`
- `META-INF/signature.asc`
**伪代码示例**
```python
import zipfile
def create_signed_zip(output_path: str):
with zipfile.ZipFile(output_path, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zipf:
# 添加报告文件
zipf.write('summary.json', 'summary.json')
zipf.write('assets.json', 'assets.json')
zipf.write('vulnerabilities.json', 'vulnerabilities.json')
zipf.write('weakPasswords.json', 'weakPasswords.json')
zipf.write('漏洞评估报告.html', '漏洞评估报告.html')
# 添加签名文件
zipf.write('META-INF/manifest.json', 'META-INF/manifest.json')
zipf.write('META-INF/signature.asc', 'META-INF/signature.asc')
```
## 四、完整流程示例
### 4.1 Python 完整示例
```python
import hashlib
import hmac
import base64
import json
import zipfile
import hkdf
import gnupg
def generate_report_zip(
licence: str,
fingerprint: str,
task_id: str,
inspection_id: int,
output_path: str
):
"""
生成带签名和加密的检查报告 ZIP 文件
"""
# ========== 1. 读取报告文件 ==========
assets_content = read_file("assets.json")
vulnerabilities_content = read_file("vulnerabilities.json")
weak_passwords_content = read_file("weakPasswords.json")
report_html_content = read_file("漏洞评估报告.html")
# ========== 2. 生成设备签名 ==========
# 2.1 密钥派生
ikm = licence + fingerprint
salt = "AUTH_V3_SALT"
info = "device_report_signature"
key_length = 32
derived_key = hkdf.HKDF(
algorithm=hashlib.sha256,
length=key_length,
salt=salt.encode('utf-8'),
info=info.encode('utf-8'),
ikm=ikm.encode('utf-8')
).derive()
# 2.2 计算文件 SHA256
def sha256_hex(content: bytes) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
assets_sha256 = sha256_hex(assets_content)
vulnerabilities_sha256 = sha256_hex(vulnerabilities_content)
weak_passwords_sha256 = sha256_hex(weak_passwords_content)
report_html_sha256 = sha256_hex(report_html_content)
# 2.3 组装签名数据(严格顺序)
sign_payload = (
str(task_id) +
str(inspection_id) +
assets_sha256 +
vulnerabilities_sha256 +
weak_passwords_sha256 +
report_html_sha256
)
# 2.4 计算 HMAC-SHA256
mac = hmac.new(
key=derived_key,
msg=sign_payload.encode('utf-8'),
digestmod=hashlib.sha256
)
device_signature = base64.b64encode(mac.digest()).decode('utf-8')
# 2.5 生成 summary.json
summary = {
"orgId": 1173040813421105152,
"checkId": inspection_id,
"taskId": task_id,
"licence": licence,
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
"deviceSignature": device_signature,
"summary": "检查摘要信息"
}
summary_content = json.dumps(summary, ensure_ascii=False).encode('utf-8')
# ========== 3. 生成 OpenPGP 签名 ==========
# 3.1 生成 manifest.json
files_hashes = {
"summary.json": sha256_hex(summary_content),
"assets.json": assets_sha256,
"vulnerabilities.json": vulnerabilities_sha256,
"weakPasswords.json": weak_passwords_sha256,
"漏洞评估报告.html": report_html_sha256
}
manifest = {"files": files_hashes}
manifest_content = json.dumps(manifest, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2).encode('utf-8')
# 3.2 生成 OpenPGP 签名
gpg = gnupg.GPG()
with open('META-INF/manifest.json', 'wb') as f:
f.write(manifest_content)
with open('META-INF/manifest.json', 'rb') as f:
signed_data = gpg.sign_file(
f,
detach=True,
output='META-INF/signature.asc'
)
# ========== 4. 打包 ZIP 文件 ==========
with zipfile.ZipFile(output_path, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zipf:
zipf.writestr('summary.json', summary_content)
zipf.writestr('assets.json', assets_content)
zipf.writestr('vulnerabilities.json', vulnerabilities_content)
zipf.writestr('weakPasswords.json', weak_passwords_content)
zipf.writestr('漏洞评估报告.html', report_html_content)
zipf.writestr('META-INF/manifest.json', manifest_content)
zipf.write('META-INF/signature.asc', 'META-INF/signature.asc')
print(f"报告 ZIP 文件生成成功: {output_path}")
```
### 4.2 Java/Kotlin 完整示例
```kotlin
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.digests.SHA256Digest
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.generators.HKDFBytesGenerator
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.HKDFParameters
import java.security.MessageDigest
import javax.crypto.Mac
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
import java.util.Base64
import java.util.zip.ZipOutputStream
import java.io.FileOutputStream
fun generateReportZip(
licence: String,
fingerprint: String,
taskId: String,
inspectionId: Long,
outputPath: String
) {
// ========== 1. 读取报告文件 ==========
val assetsContent = readFile("assets.json")
val vulnerabilitiesContent = readFile("vulnerabilities.json")
val weakPasswordsContent = readFile("weakPasswords.json")
val reportHtmlContent = readFile("漏洞评估报告.html")
// ========== 2. 生成设备签名 ==========
// 2.1 密钥派生
val ikm = (licence + fingerprint).toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)
val salt = "AUTH_V3_SALT".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)
val info = "device_report_signature".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)
val keyLength = 32
val hkdf = HKDFBytesGenerator(SHA256Digest())
hkdf.init(HKDFParameters(ikm, salt, info))
val derivedKey = ByteArray(keyLength)
hkdf.generateBytes(derivedKey, 0, keyLength)
// 2.2 计算文件 SHA256
fun sha256Hex(content: ByteArray): String {
val digest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
val hashBytes = digest.digest(content)
return hashBytes.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
}
val assetsSha256 = sha256Hex(assetsContent)
val vulnerabilitiesSha256 = sha256Hex(vulnerabilitiesContent)
val weakPasswordsSha256 = sha256Hex(weakPasswordsContent)
val reportHtmlSha256 = sha256Hex(reportHtmlContent)
// 2.3 组装签名数据(严格顺序)
val signPayload = buildString {
append(taskId)
append(inspectionId)
append(assetsSha256)
append(vulnerabilitiesSha256)
append(weakPasswordsSha256)
append(reportHtmlSha256)
}
// 2.4 计算 HMAC-SHA256
val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
val secretKey = SecretKeySpec(derivedKey, "HmacSHA256")
mac.init(secretKey)
val signatureBytes = mac.doFinal(signPayload.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
val deviceSignature = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(signatureBytes)
// 2.5 生成 summary.json
val summary = mapOf(
"orgId" to 1173040813421105152L,
"checkId" to inspectionId,
"taskId" to taskId,
"licence" to licence,
"fingerprint" to fingerprint,
"deviceSignature" to deviceSignature,
"summary" to "检查摘要信息"
)
val summaryContent = objectMapper.writeValueAsString(summary).toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)
// ========== 3. 生成 OpenPGP 签名 ==========
// 3.1 生成 manifest.json
val filesHashes = mapOf(
"summary.json" to sha256Hex(summaryContent),
"assets.json" to assetsSha256,
"vulnerabilities.json" to vulnerabilitiesSha256,
"weakPasswords.json" to weakPasswordsSha256,
"漏洞评估报告.html" to reportHtmlSha256
)
val manifest = mapOf("files" to filesHashes)
val manifestContent = objectMapper.writeValueAsString(manifest).toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)
// 3.2 生成 OpenPGP 签名(使用 BouncyCastle
val signatureAsc = generatePGPSignature(manifestContent, privateKey, publicKey)
// ========== 4. 打包 ZIP 文件 ==========
ZipOutputStream(FileOutputStream(outputPath)).use { zipOut ->
zipOut.putNextEntry(ZipEntry("summary.json"))
zipOut.write(summaryContent)
zipOut.closeEntry()
zipOut.putNextEntry(ZipEntry("assets.json"))
zipOut.write(assetsContent)
zipOut.closeEntry()
zipOut.putNextEntry(ZipEntry("vulnerabilities.json"))
zipOut.write(vulnerabilitiesContent)
zipOut.closeEntry()
zipOut.putNextEntry(ZipEntry("weakPasswords.json"))
zipOut.write(weakPasswordsContent)
zipOut.closeEntry()
zipOut.putNextEntry(ZipEntry("漏洞评估报告.html"))
zipOut.write(reportHtmlContent)
zipOut.closeEntry()
zipOut.putNextEntry(ZipEntry("META-INF/manifest.json"))
zipOut.write(manifestContent)
zipOut.closeEntry()
zipOut.putNextEntry(ZipEntry("META-INF/signature.asc"))
zipOut.write(signatureAsc)
zipOut.closeEntry()
}
println("报告 ZIP 文件生成成功: $outputPath")
}
```
## 五、平台端验证流程
平台端会按以下顺序验证:
1. **OpenPGP 签名验证**(防篡改)
- 读取 `META-INF/manifest.json``META-INF/signature.asc`
- 使用平台公钥验证签名
- 验证所有文件的 SHA256 是否与 manifest.json 中的哈希值匹配
2. **设备签名验证**(授权)
-`summary.json` 提取 `licence``fingerprint``taskId``deviceSignature`
- 验证 `licence + fingerprint` 是否已绑定
- 验证 `taskId` 是否存在且属于该设备
- 使用相同的 HKDF 派生密钥
- 重新计算签名并与 `deviceSignature` 比较
## 六、常见错误和注意事项
### 6.1 设备签名验证失败
**可能原因**
1. **密钥派生错误**:确保使用正确的 `salt``info` 参数
2. **签名数据顺序错误**:必须严格按照 `taskId + inspectionId + SHA256(...)` 的顺序
3. **SHA256 格式错误**:必须是 hex 字符串(小写),不能包含分隔符
4. **文件内容错误**:确保使用原始文件内容,不能进行编码转换
5. **licence 或 fingerprint 不匹配**:确保与平台绑定的值一致
### 6.2 OpenPGP 签名验证失败
**可能原因**
1. **私钥不匹配**:确保使用与平台公钥对应的私钥
2. **manifest.json 格式错误**:确保 JSON 格式正确
3. **文件哈希值错误**:确保 manifest.json 中的哈希值与实际文件匹配
### 6.3 文件缺失
**必需文件**
- `summary.json`(必须包含授权字段)
- `assets.json`
- `vulnerabilities.json`
- `weakPasswords.json`(文件名大小写不敏感)
- `漏洞评估报告.html`(文件名包含"漏洞评估报告"且以".html"结尾)
- `META-INF/manifest.json`
- `META-INF/signature.asc`
## 七、安全设计说明
### 7.1 为什么第三方无法伪造
1. **设备签名**
- 只有拥有正确 `licence + fingerprint` 的设备才能派生正确的签名密钥
- 即使第三方获取了某个设备的签名,也无法用于其他任务(`taskId` 绑定)
- 即使第三方修改了报告内容,签名也会失效(多个文件的 SHA256 绑定)
2. **OpenPGP 签名**
- 只有拥有私钥的工具箱才能生成有效签名
- 任何文件修改都会导致哈希值不匹配
### 7.2 密钥分离
使用 HKDF 的 `info` 参数区分不同用途的密钥:
- `device_report_signature`:用于设备签名
- 其他用途可以使用不同的 `info` 值,确保密钥隔离
## 八、测试建议
1. **单元测试**
- 测试密钥派生是否正确
- 测试签名生成和验证是否匹配
- 测试文件 SHA256 计算是否正确
2. **集成测试**
- 使用真实数据生成 ZIP 文件
- 上传到平台验证是否通过
- 测试篡改文件后验证是否失败
3. **边界测试**
- 测试文件缺失的情况
- 测试签名数据顺序错误的情况
- 测试错误的 `licence``fingerprint` 的情况
## 九、参考实现
- **HKDF 实现**BouncyCastleJava/Kotlin`hkdf`Python
- **HMAC-SHA256**Java `javax.crypto.Mac`、Python `hmac`
- **OpenPGP**BouncyCastleJava/Kotlin`gnupg`Python
## 十、联系支持
如有问题,请联系平台技术支持团队。